↓ Skip to main content
  1. Statistics/

The Russia-Ukraine War in Numbers: Casualties, Displacement and Opinion

·877 words
Miles Wallace
Author
Miles Wallace

All figures below are estimates, not confirmed totals. Military casualty counts in particular vary widely by source, method and cutoff date; where sources disagree, the range is given rather than a single number.

War duration
#

  • Russian annexation of Crimea: February–March 2014
  • War in Donbas (pre-full-scale invasion): April 2014–February 2022
  • Full-scale invasion: began February 24, 2022; as of October 2026, in its fifth year
  • Total elapsed time since the conflict’s 2014 origin: 12+ years

Russian military casualties (killed + wounded, unless noted)
#

SourceEstimate
Ukraine General Staff (official claim, cumulative, unverified)1,572,790 — Oct 22, 2026
Western official estimate (via Russia Matters)1,000,000 — Feb 2026
CSIS1,200,000, incl. up to 325,000 killed — Jan 2026
UK Ministry of Defence~1,168,000 — Dec 2025
Mediazona / BBC (named, confirmed dead only)200,000+ — Feb 2026
Meduza / Mediazona (named, confirmed dead only)352,000 — May 2026

Ukraine’s own daily tally added roughly 1,560–2,250 Russian personnel losses per day in mid-to-late October 2026, which it describes as a new single-day record (2,250, Oct. 22, 2026, versus the prior record of 2,200 set in December 2024). Figures from the Ukrainian government are not independently verifiable and run well above most Western estimates.

Ukrainian military casualties (killed + wounded, unless noted)
#

SourceEstimate
Zelenskyy (official, killed only)55,000 — Feb 2026
Former senior Western official (killed + wounded)250,000–300,000 — Feb 2026
CSIS500,000–600,000, incl. 100,000–140,000 killed — Jan 2026
CSIS (updated)525,000–625,000 — Jul 2026
Bloomberg / WSJ, citing Western officials1,200,000, incl. 325,000 killed — Feb 2026
The Telegraph, citing Western officials1,400,000, incl. 500,000 killed — Sep 2026

Ukraine’s own official figures are consistently the lowest in the field; most third-party Western estimates place Ukrainian losses well above the government’s public number.

Civilian casualties (OHCHR, Ukraine)
#

  • Cumulative, Feb 24, 2022–Sep 30, 2026: 17,605 killed, 55,846 injured (actual total likely higher per OHCHR)
  • January–September 2026 alone: 2,570 killed, 15,211 wounded
  • Deadliest month on record since May 2022: July 2026, 437 killed, 2,610 injured
  • September 2026: 328 killed, 2,105 injured — the worst September of the war to date
  • Leading cause of civilian casualties (June 2026): long-range missiles and drones, 45% of total
  • Second-leading cause (July 2026): glide bombs

Ukraine displacement: internal vs. external
#

CategoryFigure
Internally displaced (UNHCR)3.7 million — Feb 2026
Internally displaced (IOM)~3.9 million — Jul 2026
Refugees abroad, global total (UNHCR)5.9 million — Feb 2026
Refugees abroad, Europe only (UNHCR)~5.2 million — 2026
People inside Ukraine needing humanitarian assistance10.8 million — Feb 2026

Internal displacement has shifted toward eastern Ukraine as front-line areas there have come under the heaviest pressure.

Russia displacement: internal vs. external
#

CategoryFigure
Internally displaced by Kursk incursion (Russian ombudsman figure)152,000+ — 2024–2025
Evacuated from Kursk/Belgorod fighting (Russian government figure)~144,000, incl. 133,000+ Kursk, 11,000+ Belgorod — through 2025
Kursk civilians reported killed, regional prosecutor350+ — May 2025
Kursk residents reported missing1,174 official / up to 3,000 per families — 2025
Wartime emigrants abroad still outside Russia~650,000 — 2025 estimate
Total 2022 emigration wave, all causes~650,000–800,000 — 2022
Men estimated to have left to avoid conscription200,000–800,000, range across sources — 2022–2025
Emigrants who later returned to Russia~8% over one year — OutRush study

Russia’s internal displacement is a narrow, border-region phenomenon tied to one incursion rather than a nationwide pattern; its external movement, by contrast, is large, sustained and still active — emergency emigration-assistance requests reportedly rose eightfold between July and September 2026, though researchers describe the current wave as smaller than 2022’s.

Russian public opinion: who is and isn’t “in the fold”
#

MeasureFigure
Support for Russian armed forces’ actions in Ukraine72.2% — Feb 2026, down from 75.8% in Jan 2026
Support for continuing the full-scale war24% — Mar 2026, lowest recorded
Support for peace negotiations67% — Mar 2026
Support for peace negotiations (Dec 2025 baseline)66.4% — Dec 2025, highest since Levada began tracking in Sep 2022
Belief the war will end in Russian victory74% — Jan 2026
Belief the war will end in 202655% — 2026 poll

Levada Center is designated a “foreign agent” by Russian authorities; its polls are conducted in-person with roughly 1,600 respondents. Taken together, a majority still backs the military’s actions, but support for continued fighting specifically has fallen to its lowest recorded level, while support for a negotiated end has risen to its highest, alongside sustained outward emigration in the hundreds of thousands.

Sources:

Featured map: “2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine” by Viewsridge, CC BY-SA 4.0, cropped from the original.